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Certain types of criminal activity are consensual and covert. Hence
they are virtually undetectable without the use of a government
agent or informer. Narcotics peddlers, brokers of counterfeit
currency. . . all do business clandestinely. Their crimes are likely
to go unchecked unless the government can itself approach a
suspect to offer him the opportunity to commit a crime and thus
give evidence of his guilt.'
Introduction
A sentiment clearly evinced by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals is that informants and undercover government
agents are necessary to combat crime.2 The use of these methods by
law enforcement agencies has caused an outcry from criminal defen-
dants and their attorneys.3 The cry "I was entrapped" has become
quite commonplace, and thus a popular avenue of defense. However,
the general principles of law regarding the defense of entrapment are
multi-faceted. The purpose of this note is to review those principles as
they have been applied by the recently organized Eleventh Circuit and
its progenitor, the former Fifth Circuit.4
Burdens of Proof
The entrapment defense was first recognized by the United States
1. Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 960 (1969).
2. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 2908 (1982).
3. See Winter, Probing the Probers, Does Abscam Go Too Far? 68 A.B.A. J.
1347 (1982).
4. The Eleventh Circuit in the case Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to the close of the business day September 30, 1981.
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Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States.5 The Court has since re-
stated that entrapment occurs "when the criminal design originates
with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of
an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and
induce its commission in order that they may prosecute."' Thus, the
central theme of the entrapment defense is that the individual lacked
the predisposition to commit the crime.7
Since entrapment is an affirmative defense, the defendant must
present some initial evidence before the issue is properly raised.8 Al-
though the Fifth Circuit employed various formulations of the defen-
dant's burden of production in United States v. Hill,9 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has arrived at a definitive standard:
If there is any evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury,
would show that the government's conduct created a substantial
risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than
one ready to commit it, then, as in all other cases, involving ques-
tions of guilt or innocence, the jury must be permitted to resolve
the matter.10
5. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6. United States v. Branca, 677 F.2d 59, 61 (1 th Cir. 1982) (quoting Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).
7. United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 834 (11th Cir. 1982). See also United
States v. Humphrey, 670 F.2d 153, 155 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Webster,
649 F.2d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
8. See Humphrey, 670 F.2d at 155; Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384.
9. 626 F.2d 1301, 1303 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980), the court noted that the different
constructions of the defendant's burden of production had not lead to dissimilar results.
They settled with the Pierce formulation, while inviting comparisons of the various
tests. Compare e.g., United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979)("defen-
dant must adduce some evidence, more than a scintilla, which tends to show govern-
ment inducement and lack of predisposition"), with United States v. Timberlake, 559
F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir. 1977)(defendant must submit entrapment theory "for which
there is any foundation in the evidence"), and with United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507
F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975) (defendant must
present "a prima facie case of entrapment indicating the government created a 'sub-
stantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to
commit it' ").
10. Humphrey, 670 F.2d at 155 (originally enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in
Pierce, 414 F.2d at 168).
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/6
Entrapment
7:1983
This standard requires the defendant come forward with evidence
showing the government's conduct created a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to com-
mit it." Whether the defendant's evidence is sufficient to meet this bur-
den of production is a question of law for the court. 2 Former Fifth
Circuit opinions appear to only require some evidence of government
inducement.. In Hill, however, the Fifth Circuit Court made clear that
"a reading of those cases reveal[ed] that 'inducement' represent[ed]
more than mere suggestion, solicitation, or initiation of contact and, in
fact, embodies an element of persuasion or mild coercion functionally
equivalent to that denoted in the Pierce formulation .. ."IS To raise
entrapment, a defendant must, therefore, prove more than that the gov-
ernment solicited him or provided the opportunity for the crime.' 4 He
must show "mild persuasion or coercion"' 5 by the government. Evi-
dence from the government's case in chief may be sufficient to raise the
issue.' 6 Once the defendant has sustained this burden, the issue of en-
trapment becomes a question of fact for the jury.'7
11. The Eleventh Circuit recalled the comparisons made by the Hill court, and
similarly adopted the "substantial risk" formulation of Pierce in Humphrey, 670 F.2d
at 155.
12. United States v. Tate, 554 F.2d 1341, 1344 (5th Cir. 1977).
13. 626 F.2d at 1304. Also, in Hill the court invited perusal of prior cases in
which defendants had submitted evidence of government inducement. These cases in-
cluded United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1979) (testimony
indicated that the government had thought of a scheme, attempted to "push" it on
defendant, and that defendant had not favorably received the government plan); Tim-
berlake, 559 F.2d at 1379 (numerous attempts at setting up illicit deals had failed and
witness testified that on at least one occasion defendant had directly rejected govern-
ment entreaty); United States v. Costello, 483 F.2d 1366, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1973)(up-
holding trial court's refusal to submit entrapment question, finding no "inducement"
where there was no evidence of persuasion or coercion, even though government agent
proposed the illicit transaction to the defendant).
14. 679 F.2d at 835. See also Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384 (citing United States v.
Dickens, 524 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 994 (1976)): "A prose-
cution cannot be defeated merely because a government has provided the accused with
the opportunity or the facilities for the commission of the crime."
15. Bagnell, 679 F.2d at 835.
16. United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord Hill, 626 F.2d
1301, and Pierce, 414 F.2d 163.
17. United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1971).
613 1
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After having satisfied the burden of production, the burden of per-
suasion will then be on the government to prove that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.18 The government must show that the defendant was ready and
willing without persuasion to commit the offense and that the govern-
ment merely provided a propitious opportunity.1 9
In addition, the law of the Eleventh Circuit requires that the de-
fendant admit the acts charged against him when he pleads entrap-
ment °.2 The rationale for this rule is based on the fact that it would be
inconsistent to deny the very acts upon which the prosecution is predi-
cated at the same time as pleading the defense of entrapment, which
assumes that acts charged were committed.21
Predisposition
"The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and
the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not in-
clude the manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth
and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police of-
18. Humphrey, 670 F.2d at 155.
19. See Wolffs, 594 F.2d at 80; United States v. Benavidez, 558 F.2d 308, 310
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir.
1952)(Hand, J.).
20. See United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329 (1lth Cir. 1982) and United
States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1982). This premise has been hotly debated
throughout the circuits. Compare United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.
1977), with United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975)(en banc) (both
cases allowed defendant to both deny wrongdoing and plead entrapment). A narrow
exception to this rule was articulated in Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 143-44
(5th Cir. 1965). The court held that a defendant may argue simultaneously that he was
entrapped to commit the overt acts charged in the indictment but was not a member of
the conspiracy. This holding, however, is limited to the situation where the govern-
ment's own case in chief injects substantial evidence to support a theory of entrapment.
In this event the defense is raised-by a motion of acquittal and by a' requested jury
instruction in which the government must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt defen-
dant's guilt of the act charged. For a discussion of this debate see note, Denial of the
Crime and the Availability of the Entrapment Defense in the Federal Courts, 22
B.C.L. REV. 911 (1981).
21. United States v. Williamson, 482 F.2d 508, 513 (5th Cir. 1973).
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ficer." 22 Nevertheless, the fact that government agents merely afford
opportunity for the commission of an offense does not constitute entrap-
ment: "[T]o determine whether entrapment has been established a line
must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap
for the unwary criminal. 28 The defendant's lack of predisposition to
commit the crime is the principal element of the entrapment defense. 4
Evidence Admissible to Prove Predisposition
The United States Supreme Court has enunciated a number of
elements which can be considered in determining whether a defendant
was a person "otherwise innocent" 25 in whom the government had im-
planted the criminal design. These elements were more distinctly stated
by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Reynoso Ulloa. 2
1. The character of the defendant including any previous criminal
activity.
2. Whether the suggestion to engage in criminal activity originated
with the government.
3. Whether defendant sought financial profit from the criminal
activity.
4. Whether there is evidence of reluctance on the part of the defen-
dant to proceed with the offense.
5. Whether the government induced the defendant to act by repeti-
tive persuasion.
6. The nature of the government's inducement or persuasion.
The United States Supreme Court has found evidence of a reluctance
to engage in criminal activity which was overcome by repeated govern-
ment inducement to be highly significant.28
22. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
23. Id. at 372.
24. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
25. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
26. 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1977).
27. Id. at 1336. However, fact number two does not prove entrapment since mere
solicitation is insufficient. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Sherman, 365 U.S. at 373 (one request by government was not
enough, "additional ones were necessary to overcome, first petitioners refusal, then his
evasiveness, and then his hesitancy. . . "); Sorrells, 287 U.S. 436 (The government
615 1
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By raising a defense of entrapment, the defendant opens himself
up to a "searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition." 9
Evidence of the defendant's prior similar acts is essential to the ques-
tion of predisposition, and under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) evi-
dence of prior convictions are admissible to prove predisposition. The
government, however, is not restricted to only introducing past crimes
to prove predisposition. A defendant's use of drugs may be effective to
establish a predisposition to deal in narcotics when he is charged with
an offense of this nature. 1 In addition, the defendant's own statements
may provide evidence of his predisposition. In United States v. Jen-
kins, 2 the court found that the defendant's post-crime statement ("if
you need more, I'll be there"3 3) constituted sufficient evidence to permit
the trier of fact to infer a prior willingness to commit a narcotics of-
fense. It is important to note, however that the government may not
introduce out-of-court statements about the defendant's reputation for
criminal conduct as evidence of predisposition.
agent asked for liquor and was twice refused, but the agent persisted in soliciting the
defendant and taking advantage of sentiment aroused by conversation about their ser-
vice together as companions in World War I.).
29. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
30. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
31. United States v. Smith, 407 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1969). It is also significant to
note that testimony concerning a defendant's drug use at the time of the crime would
have been admissible to establish the res gestae. See United States v. McDaniel, 574
F.2d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978).
32. 480 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. Id. at 1200.
34. See United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc),
where the court held that "only in special circumstances may the government prove
what its agents have been told about the defendant as evidence of good faith, reasona-
bleness or proper motive of the government and then only to rebut contrary assertions
by the defendant." In Webster, the defendant was charged with possessing and distrib-
uting cocaine. The defendant's defense was entrapment. He tried to prove that his ille-
gal acts were precipitated by the incessant urgings of a female informant. To rebut this
claim that the defendant was just an "innocent dupe," a Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration Agent testified for the prosecution that a few months before the arrest he had
Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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Once a defendant makes it clear that his defense is entrapment,
there is nothing to prevent the prosecution from going forward with its
evidence on predisposition. Thus, the prosecution need not wait until
rebuttal to introduce predisposition evidence, but may do so in its case
in chief. In United States v. Vendetti, 5 after the defendant raised the
entrapment defense in his opening statement, the government presented
its evidence of predisposition during its case in chief. The defendant
attacked this order of proof in his appeal. The court responded: "No
cases are cited, nor can be found which require the prosecutor to wait
until a defendant has fully developed his proof before presenting evi-
dence on predisposition."' 6
Entrapment as a Matter of Law
Many defendants have argued entrapment as a matter of law rely-
ing upon United States v. Bueno.7 In Bueno, the facts gave rise to
what later has been called a "full circle" transaction 8 in which a gov-
ernment agent supplied drugs to the defendant for sale to another gov-
ernment agent.3 9 This type of transaction is distinguished from the
more common one, where the defendant procures the narcotics from a
private source. However this case and others like it, which have found
entrapment as a matter of law, have been undermined, if not rejected
entirely. 0 The United States Supreme Court, in Hampton v. United
been told by a reliable informant that he had purchased cocaine from the defendant on
several occasions. The trial court had allowed this testimony because prior to Webster
the Fifth Circuit had permitted the prosecution to introduce both hearsay and double-
level hearsay as a means of proving the defendant's predisposition. This evidence was
permitted through the character/reputation provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence
404(a)(1), 405 and 803(21) collectively). In striking down this practice the Webster
court adamantly asserted: "predisposition is a state of mind, not a character trait." 649
F.2d at 350.
35. No. 7805668, slip op. at 1 (5th Cir. Apr. 24, 1979).
36. Id. at 2. In addition, the procedure under attack was followed and approved
in Rocha v. United States, 401 F.2d 529, 530 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1103 (1969).
37. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973).
38. See United States v. Evers, 552 F.2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g de-
nied, 556 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977).
39. Id.
40. Id. The court intimated that the Bueno defense had become obsolete in the
7
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States,41 indicated that not even a "full circle" transaction was entrap-
ment "per se". This is because the primary focus of the entrapment
defense is not on what acts the government agents committed, but
rather on whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the of-
fense.4 2 If the defendant was willing to commit the act, no entrapment
occurs regardless of surrounding circumstances.
Governmental Misconduct and Overreaching
The governmental misconduct defense, also available to defendants
and often employed in tandem with entrapment, is based on principles
of due process and the supervisory powers of the court. While the en-
trapment defense requires the court to focus on predisposition of the
defendant to commit the crime, the United States Supreme Court has
established that, for cases involving alleged governmental misconduct,
the focus of the court's inquiry shall be directed solely toward the gov-
ernment's conduct. 43 Often cited by defendants in support of this de-
fense is the following statement from United States v. Russell." "[W]e
may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of
law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction. . . . "" This was the type of defense employed
in Rochin v. California.46 In Rochin, the United States Supreme Court
found that the record revealed "a shocking series of violations of consti-
tutional rights."' 47 In that case, deputy sheriffs illegally broke into
wake of Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) and United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973). In United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th 1977), reh'g
denied, 562 F.2d 1257, (1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978), the court stated
"whatever the fate of Bueno, it is now clear that the expression 'entrapment as a mat-
ter of law', has become a misnomer with respect to predisposed defendants." Id. at
1324.
41. 425 U.S. at 489-90.
42. Whether the defense is designed to deter objectionable police conduct or to
protect "otherwise innocent" defendants is discussed in Note, Entrapment: A Source of
Continuing Confusion in the Lower Courts, 5 AM. J. TRIAL AD. 293 (1981).
43. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490.
44. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
45. Id. at 431-32.
46. 342 U.S. 164 (1952).
47. Id. at 172.
8
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Rochin's home and forceably attempted to extract capsules which
Rochin had ingested. At the hospital, the deputy sheriffs directed a
doctor to "pump" Rochin's stomach in order to obtain two morphine
capsules. The Court found this was conduct that "shocks the con-
science" 48 and offends even those with hardened sensibilities, constitut-
ing methods "too close to the rack and screw."'49 Both the Hampton
and Rochin decisions indicate the defense is intended to embody only
profoundly outrageous and shocking conduct which violate the defen-
dant's constitutional rights.50
While the Court in those cases stated they cannot condone police
activity as employed in Rochin, the Supreme Court asserted that it will
not allow defendants to raise "defenses" which in essence, would give
the federal judiciary an absolute veto right over law enforcement
practices.51
Use of Confidential Informants
An issue often appearing in relation to government conduct is the
government's use of confidential informants. 52 Defendants frequently
rely on Williamson v. United States. 3 In Williamson, a Fifth Circuit
case, an informer was hired by a government agent to procure evidence
against persons known by the agent to be involved in an illicit whiskey
business. The informer would be rewarded predetermined sums upon
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Due process considerations are given excellent treatment in Note, Entrap-
ment as a Due Process Defense: Developments After Hampton v. United States 57
IND. L.J. (1982) and Abramson & Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in the
Federal Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 139 (1980).
51. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490. See also United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2908 (1982), which sets the "outer limits to
which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes in this
circuit," id. at 387, without violating due process notions. (D.E.A. established a chemi-
cal supply plant, placed an advertisement in High Times Magazine offering chemicals
and laboratory equipment, set-up and advised the defendant how to manufacture
Phencyclidene (P.C.P.)).
52. For a discussion on how law enforcement agencies are using unsuspecting
middlemen to, in effect, destroy the entrapment defense, see Note, Entrapment
Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1982).
53. 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
619 1Entrapment17:1983
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conviction of several specified individuals. The informant made the
transaction for which the defendants were convicted. However, the re-
cord lacked evidence to indicate the agents had sufficient knowledge of
defendant's involvement in the illicit whiskey trade to justify con-
tracting on a contingent fee basis to obtain legally admissible evidence.
Further, the record did not show whether the agents carefully in-
structed the informer on the rules of entrapment. Under these circum-
stances, the court held that it could not sanction the contingent fee
arrangement.
The Fifth Circuit, however, declined to extend Williamson to
other contingency fee arrangements." The court, in United States v.
McClure,55 listed the following factors for taking a case out of the do-
main of Williamson: (1) the possibility that the informant was in-
structed in the law of entrapment,56 (2) that the agent and not the
informant made the purchase 57 and (3) prior to employing the inform-
ant, the agent did not know the defendant.58 Additionally, in United
States v. Edwards,5 9 the court held that Williamson would not be use-
ful to defendants where the informant had been given a subsistence
allowance, with a later reward following conviction, so long as he was
not given a specific sum to convict a particular person.
Jury Instructions
The defendant must show "mild persuasion or coercion""0 on the
54. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 480 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 913 (1973)(where the Court refused to apply Williamson to a case in
which no specific arrangement for payment existed, no particular person was the target
of the effort to buy, and in which the purchase was made by the government agent, not
the informer); United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1976) (the court held
that the fact that an informant was paid on a contingent fee basis for making a case
did not make it entrapment).
55. 546 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1977).
56. Id. at 673. See also United States v. Garcia 528 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898 (1976).
57. McClure, 546 F.2d at 673. See also Jenkins, 480 F.2d 1198.
58. McClure, 546 F.2d at 674. See also United States v. Joseph, 533 F.2d 282
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977).
59. 549 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1977).
60. United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1982).
10
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part of the government before he is entitled to an entrapment instruc-
tion."' While evidence from the government's case in chief may be suf-
ficient to raise the issue of entrapment,62 the entrapment issue need not
be presented to the jury if the evidence does not sufficiently raise the
issue.63 The United States Supreme Court stated in Lopez v. United
States: "Indeed the paucity of the showing [of entrapment] might
well have justified a refusal to instruct the jury at all on entrapment."6 5
United States v. Pierce"6 enunciated the Eleventh Circuit's policy on
the instruction: "If the record as a whole is devoid of such [entrap-
ment] evidence, astute defense counsel may not invite confusion of the
jury by seeking charges on this or any other problem not presented by
the case before the court. '6 7 Nevertheless, failure to give an instruction
when the defendant has met his burden is reversible error.68 The in-
struction should state that the government has the burden of proof be-
yond a reasonablb doubt to show the defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime.69
Conclusion
Entrapment has been employed to defend those charged with
crimes ranging from counterfeiting to illegally shipping obscene materi-
als. Most frequently it has been relied upon to defend those charged
with crimes involving the purchase of narcotics. This defense is most
61. Id. at 835 (only showing made was government made initial contact).
62. United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord United States
v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1980); Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.
1969).
63. Pierce, 414 F.2d at 167.
64. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
65. Id. at 436.
66. 414 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
67. Id. at 168.
68. Bagnell, 679 F.2d at 835.
69. However, it is not reversible error if the jury charge fails to unequivocally
state that the government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was not entrapped so long as the court has given a general instruction on
the burden of proof and has told the jury to consider the charge as a whole. United
States v. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d
1329 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
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appropriate when the defendant has been apprehended because of evi-
dence developed by undercover police officers and confidential
informants.
However, the entrapment defense often has been misapplied and
misunderstood. Prosecutors and defense counsel alike must be alert to
its subleties for there are traps which lie in wait for the unwary
practitioner.
David M. Lazarus
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